Friday, March 29, 2013

The Policy Context of Maritime Piracy


Piracy is an unconventional security threat that individual states and the international community as a whole has to address through conventional political avenues. Much of the basis for modern piracy policy stems from the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS.) The convention provided the internationally agreed upon definition of piracy and established many rules governing the uses of the oceans and their resources. The most influential law outlined by the UNCLOS was the definition of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ). The law gave coastal states complete sovereignty of their “territorial sea,” an area up to 12 nautical miles from their shore (UN News Center). As per the definition of piracy, any crimes committed within territorial seas, internal waters, or archipelagic waters are not classified as piracy and therefore burdens states with the responsibility of policing their own waters. 

In 2008 the UN security council drastically changed the way in which states can pursue pirates by allowing jurisdiction within Somalian territorial seas. UN Resolution 1816 gave states the power to:
(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; and
(b) Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery ...(Roach 400). 

This resolution is extremely significant because it infringed upon Somalian maritime sovereignty for the purpose of international security. The jurisdiction previously held solely by Somalia now can be asserted by any number of states as long as they show they are a relevant participant in the prosecution (Warbrick 690). Under normal circumstances, only the Somali government would be able to prosecute crimes that happened within their territorial seas but that is no longer the case. Although the TFG consented to these measures, the legislation marks a clear escalation of international involvement in the conflict. Many aspects of UNSCR 1816 are vague and require some interpretation by the interdicting state for example there is no clear law saying who can try the offenders. Holland can exercise their “jurisdiction” to pursue and arrest the vessel but they don’t necessarily have the authority to hold and try the captured pirates or even safely escort victims and witnesses home. Clearly this could lead to legal issues when multiple states are involved but no law exists to guide them. 

Many other international efforts have been made to combat maritime piracy including the formation of groups like the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO is the UN’s specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships (imo.org). The organization was created in 1948 and is still very active in fighting modern piracy. Their main goal in terms of counter piracy is fostering regional agreements between coastal states. One example is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP.) Members include China, Japan, India, Korea, Myanmar, the Phillippines, Norway, the UK, Viet Nam, and several others (Bradford 490). The agreement was spearheaded by Japan and exists to facilitate communication and information sharing among member states to better understand the piracy situation in Asia. The ReCAAP was very successful in combatting piracy in the Malacca Straits and the IMO hopes to replicate those results in other regions. Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen drafted a non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) that pledged similar information-sharing practices to ReCAAP but without legally binding obligations. They did, however, institute a system of “ship-riders” which would reinforce regional cooperation (Roach 405). A ship-rider is a law enforcement official from one state that goes aboard the ship of another state. In international waters this is a huge advantage because you are only allowed to pursue vessels from your host state. Having officials from multiple flag-states enables them to pursue more vessels. Regional cooperations like these mark a shift in policy from state-focused piracy prevention to regionally-focused prevention. A coastal state simply cannot protect all of its maritime assets alone, multilateral solutions make piracy prevention much more feasible.  

To get a more detailed look at counter-piracy measures, I examined a few major powers with a strong voice in the discussion. Japan was inevitably part of that list because their economy is completely dependent on trade and therefore piracy is very threatening to their security. For this reason they emerged as an anti-piracy leader in Asia in 1999 and have remained so ever since. Japan would prefer to form multilateral solutions, as they do with most political roles, but the diverse interests of coastal states hampers that. Unfortunately many solutions they proposed such as a regional coast guard body, increased state support for shipping companies, and cooperation of regional responses were shot down by other powers. Bilateral arrangements were eventually very successful and led to anti-piracy training exercises with India, Malaysia, India, and Thailand, among others (Bradford 490). The ReCAAP was spearheaded by Japan and marked the first successful multilateral operation in Asia. 

I must also bring the United States into this discussion because they are one of the largest maritime powers in the world and work extensively towards piracy prevention. In 2007, the Bush administration created a comprehensive piracy policy developed through the National Security Council.  The policy established 7 goals: prevention, deterrence, reduced vulnerability, accountability for pirates, preservation of the freedom of the seas, protection of lines of communication, and the leadership and support of international efforts (Kraska, Wilson). The policy stressed international cooperation with the US as the leader but also created substantial codes such as the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code. This requires operators of ships and port facilities that handle ships of more than 500 gross tons to develop, implement, and evaluate security plans. These types of measures are helpful because they set universal standards but they can be difficult to implement.

More recently the US has been acting through NATO to counter piracy. NATO’s current operation is called Operation Ocean Shield and focuses on the prevention and deterrence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden/Somalia region. The operation is meant to assist regional states in developing their capabilities and reinforce existing international efforts (Baruah 31). Maritime security is still incredibly important to the US but they now realize that unilateral action is not always the best route. Their use of NATO and the general cooperative nature of current policies highlight the multilateral trends emerging in the counter piracy field. 

The largest problem with current piracy policy is the vague nature of jurisdiction laws. Capturing pirates is only the first step, then you must decide what to do with the “persons under control.” Any country can assert jurisdiction over a universal crime but should every state be permitted to prosecute them? Many vessels lack clear loyalties and could be registered in one nation, owned by a corporation in another, and operated by a crew from several others. When you include the nationality of the pirates and the origin of the cargo you have even more conflicting players. So who has the right to prosecution? Somalia is a failed state and doesn’t have the infrastructure to deal with captured pirates, tribal regions are often an unreliable source of justice, and extraditing pirates to a Western country is far too costly (Kraska, Wilson). At this time there is no clear answer to this problem. A strong, stable Somalia would be the best option but it seems we are far from that prospect. Many times pirates are released because there is nowhere to try their crimes. I believe this issue must be addressed if the international community is serious about combatting piracy. Preventative measures are important but we must also be prepared to deal with the aftermath. 



WORKS CITED 

Baruah, Darshana M. "NATO’s Approach to Counter-Piracy." E-International Relations. N.p., 31 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 Mar. 2013. 

Bradford, John F. "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the Coastal State Responses." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.3 (2004): 480-505. JSTOR. Web. 25 Mar. 2013. 

Kraska, James, JAGC, U.S. Navy, and Brian Wilson, JAGC, U.S. Navy. "Piracy, Policy, and Law." Proceedings Magazine 1270th ser. 134.12 (2008): n. pag. U.S. Naval Institute. Web. 26 Mar. 2013.

Kraska, James, and Brian Wilson. "Combatting Piracy in International Waters." Web log post. World Policy Blog. N.p., 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 24 Mar. 2013.

"Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships." IMO.org. International Maritime Organization, n.d. Web. 25 Mar. 2013.

Roach, Ashley. "Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions." The American Journal of International Law 104.3 (2010): 397-416.JSTOR. Web. 26 Mar. 2013. 

"United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982." UN News Center. UN, 09 Nov. 2011. Web. 25 Mar. 2013. 

Warbrick, Colin, Dominic McGoldrick, and Douglas Guilfoyle. "Ii. Piracy Off Somalia: Un Security Council Resolution 1816 And Imo Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts."International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57.03 (2008): 690. Print.

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Piracy- A literary review


Piracy-A Literary Review


“In the immediate nearness of the gold, all else had been forgotten [...], and I could not doubt that he hoped to seize upon the treasure, find and board the Hispanola under cover of night, cut every honest throat about that island, and sail away as he had at first intended, laden with crimes and riches.”
 Robert L. Stevenson. “Treasure Island”

In contemporary world, when the word “pirate “is mentioned, images of Johnny Depp as Captain Jack Sparrow instantly come to mind. Media and film industry had done all possible to present image of piracy in a quite unrealistic, romanticized sense, not trying to emphasize the seriousness and make people think what is the real story behind the black flag.
Different authors have different approaches and different feelings about piracy. Let us turn back in time, and look shortly at piracy throughout history. Authors like Angus Konstam explored this from historical point of view claiming that piracy had always been an issue- connecting that one`s desire to explore, travel and use the benefits that sea has to offer. Geographical discoveries from 14th-16th centuries changed the way piracy worked. First, it widened the area in which piracy used to be a security problem. Technology, improvement in building ships, development of international market and colonialism in pre-capitalistic era n 17th century evolved into golden age of piracy. Many authors argue that changing geopolitical picture in the world, as capitalism was about to take over changed the perception of piracy as a global issue. The Holly Alliance controlled politics in Europe and most of its colonies. In their resolutions they mention certain policies that were pursued by courts of Vienna and Berlin- great punishments for piracy and securing the trade companies, as well as intercontinental trade development. That had an impact on lowering danger coming from piracy as well as changing the way of life, and creating some different security problems.
Group of scholars from University of Novi Sad argued that piracy had never disappeared, no matter how the world we live in changed and affected creating different security threats. What has changed is policies and perception of piracy. Relationship between national versus human security is really significant in explaining maritime piracy. In the past, piracy affected kingdoms, empires, governments, trade and construction companies. Piracy was in the way of colonialism, and UK, Spain, Portugal, France and Netherlands were fighting with all their means.  It posed threat to a socio-economic system at the time.  To be a pirate – it meant stealing, crime, death, lack of humanity, but at the same time resistance, mythology and a legend. Yet, not all of the pirates wanted to be like Robin Hood and steal in the name of poor, oppressed nations. Contemporary perception of maritime is different, so are threats it poses, and what is affected by it. Colonialism doesn’t exist today, and the way the trade and international exchange of goods functions is quite different. Group of security scholars from Essex University had claimed that compared to “real” threats in today`s world WMDs, or terrorists, piracy is not the matter of global security.
But is that really a case? Acts of piracy in the modern world are significantly increasing and pose a great threat to the safety of maritime navigation, property and human lives. Right now, issue is centered on breakdown of the legal effects of piracy. International legal aspect (especially with reference to the Convention on the Law of the Sea) has the cumulative conditions that must be satisfied for the existence of treating this international crime at sea. Particularly relevant are measures of repression by the state. UN summit proposed some changes and progress in the classical notion of piracy, in order to more effectively combat this phenomenon of contemporary crime at sea. From the point of maritime law, the authors examine the basis of international conventions and domestic law with the act of piracy cases. Scholars are suggesting bigger institutional cooperation, as well as changing and strengthening implications of law in the international waters. Second option is strengthening implications of law in domestic coastline, and their cooperation with national institutions.
So, who exactly is affected by piracy? And why doesn’t more people react to threat of piracy? Picture we get from media is that everything becomes an issue when it affects USA. Or “white USA” at least. Piracy works on the principles of chokepoints- geographically and strategically convenient regions where trade with ships is still really active, and where regulations of International law don’t work as they should. Everything can be affected by piracy today- goods, oil, people. Even ordinary tourists can be potential target , because they are source of money. Maritime piracy is being treated differently by institutions and governments, and not all of them prioritize this as security issue, or not all of them can. Piracy today is definitely more matter of economical and human security, and it is more regional than global issue. Does that still mean we will not give our best to create valid policies to resolve this issue? People`s lives are still in game, and its proven that people who get captured by pirates suffer from trauma consequences long time after.
One thing is sure, with contemporary development of piracy, there is a  network of scholars and security experts and rising interest in resolving maritime piracy as security issue.



“Not just the Spanish Main, love. The entire ocean. The entire wo'ld. Wherever we want to go, we'll go. That's what a ship is, you know. It's not just a keel and a hull and a deck and sails, that's what a ship needs but what a ship is... what the Black Pearl really is...What piracy really is…. is freedom. “
Captain Jack Sparrow

Sources:

“Pirate Wars” Peter Earle, Methuen – London, 1973
“Piracy- the complete history”  Angus Kostnam Osprey Publishing; First UK edition (August 19, 2008)
“International law” Rodoljub Etinski , JP “Sluzbeni glasnik” , 2010

Scope and Scale of Maritime Piracy: Somalia



Even as early as the Roman era, maritime piracy has demanded the attention of states and posed a serious threat to commerce, travel and security across the globe. In 2011, 439 reported pirate attacks around the world cost an estimated $7-12 billion[1]. Emerging trends of similarly astronomical numbers have captured the attention of world leaders in recent years, leading to a resurgence of concern regarding this ancient criminal act.
 Until the late 2000’s piracy had flown under the public radar  but nonetheless  persisted at small but steady rates in the seas of Southeast Asia prior to the development of reliable records on pirate activity.  By the 1980s the rising threat of piracy had warranted enough consideration to spark implementation of anti-piracy policies, notably the creation of the International Maritime Bureau and the UN Law of the Sea Convention.[2] These strategies were initially deemed successful in steadily reducing the total number of pirate attacks reported annually. However the dramas of modern piracy returned to prominence in 2007 when attacks around Africa surpassed those in Asian waters for the first time on record. This distinct leap was due primarily to the efforts of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, where through 2009 attacks accounted for 46% of the 322 events reported globally[3]. This record year was indicative of foundational shifts in maritime piracy resulting in fewer attacks worldwide, but a drastic surge in activity emanating from Somalia with grim economic consequences.
            While more than 20,000 ships containing some 12% of the worlds transported petroleum pass through the Gulf of Aden annually, the general breakdown of rule of law and fragility of parts of the Somali state make these waters a haven for maritime pirates . In 2007, a particularly turbulent regime shift further exacerbated Somalia’s failing stability by ousting the Islamic Courts Union in favor of the Transitional Federal Government. This threw the country into chaos and created an environment conducive to pirate activity by igniting civil unrest as well as by replacing the heavy-handed treatment of piracy by the ICU with an ineffective new government. To further enrich the prospects of sea-borne thieves, a barbaric civil war and the inability of the TFG to manage a mounting list of crises led to a massive influx of international aid in 2008. Some 95% of international aid supplies to Somalia is shipped by sea.  These supplies and an estimated 3.2 million Somalis, approximately 43% of the population, were dependent on food aid in the latter part of2008.
            The direct economic costs of Somali piracy, while difficult to assess reliably, affect both their targets and hosts in a multitude of ways. Most noticeably, the average costs of recovering hostages of Somali pirates skyrocketed from $150,000 in 2005 to $4.97 million in 2010. This trend imitated the rise in the complexity and audacity of pirate organizations as they pursued bigger vessels farther from their home shores. Other major contributors to the rising cost of maritime piracy include; loss of cargo, rising insurance rates for transport vessels, the costs of heightening naval and police presence, and the costs of re-routing ships to avoid dangerous waters. Piracy greatly impedes the flow of goods by sea, which constitutes more than 80% of world trade, and aggravates preexisting conditions of instability in a host nation. Foreign trade and investment are significantly deterred by pirate activity and the hijacking of humanitarian vessels makes foreign aid hesitant in returning. In sum these direct costs are estimated to be more than $10 billion annually and represent a significant threat to interstate trade and transport as well as domestic stability.
            In two decades since its international resurgence in the 1990’s, the scale of maritime piracy has shrunk globally, while its resurgence in Eastern Africa has caused it to realize greater destructive influence. Along Somalia’s coasts, the relatively few pirate gangs that existed prior to the new millennium accounted for only 5% of the total global incidents in 2000. By 2009, the waters were home to a multitude of gangs whose global share exceeded 50%.[4] The expansion of the territory Somali pirates prey upon has already created consequences for neighboring states like Kenya through a marked reduction in foreign investment and tourism in the entire region.   
                       
               
               
               
               




[1] al., A. B. e. (2010, December 2010). "The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy." from http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf.
               
[2] Moki, J. N. A. a. S. (2009). "Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and Its Implications for Global Security." Mediterranean Quarterly 20(3): 95-121.
                I found this article useful in contextualizing the phenomena of African piracy in both history and current debates.  
[3] Chalk, P. (2010). "Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses." Brown Journal of World Affairs 16(2): 89-108.
               
[4] Section, S. a. T. A. (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. Vienna, United Nations office on Drugs and Crime: 193-200.
                This report from the UN was an excellent start to my research by presenting me with both statistical data and concise explanations of many key themes surrounding piracy. 


Piracy: Scope and Scale


Scope and Scale: Piracy as a Global Phenomenon

Maritime piracy is a multimillion-dollar criminal enterprise of vital concern to international maritime commerce and security of the communities it affects. Incidents of maritime piracy have been on the rise in recent decades. While contemporary news reporting may focus solely on the problem in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, piracy has transnational repercussions and operates along all major maritime trade routes. It faces no restrictions to where it can operate, and has plagued the waters of Asia, Africa, and South America. Piracy is a problem of human and national security that necessitates regional cooperation since it threatens international commercial interests and people.

This map is a live-action project conducted by the International Maritime Bureau that monitors international instances of piracy. Note the scale of the phenomenon in both 2013 and 2012.

Piracy has never been restricted to a single geographical location. Historically, pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries functioned in and around the Americas where and when large-scale navies were not yet established and colonies were too weak to repel them (1). Even further into antiquity, Phoenicians and Vikings conducted piratical enterprises in the Mediterranean and the North Sea/ Baltic Sea areas, respectively. Piracy in the Indian Ocean was characterized during colonial times by the intense maritime warring of both local pirates and Western European privateers. Further east, piracy in Southeast Asia was “guerrilla warfare at sea” between localities of Indonesia or Malaysia and Dutch naval power (1). As large navies became the norm in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, piracy became largely obsolete. However, the late 20th and 21st centuries have witnessed a proliferation of piratical acts around the world.

Pirates differ from those in history because they are now more sophisticated and organized. Their actions to overtake ships are systematic and carefully planned. Pirates who flood the seas with “sophisticated equipment, including speed boats, modern machine guns, communication devices, trawlers, barges, and oil industry backup ships” are extremely difficult to combat and they are therefore a serious security problem (7).


Southeast Asian and Indian Subcontinent Piracy
This region encompasses the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia

The Strait of Malacca is 520 miles long and only 11 miles wide at its opening. Ships passing from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and Pacific have to travel through this narrow strait. Annually, about 40% of the world’s maritime trade on more than 50,000 vessels passes through this strait (2).
            Pirates can easily function in this area because
1.     Reduced speed through the narrow sea passages makes ships very vulnerable to attack.
2.     There are numerous negligible and remote islets in the area that function as sanctuaries for pirates.
3.     The area offers secret coves and places to hide away.
4.     The region accounts for 15.8% of the world’s total coastline, making it difficult for authorities to patrol (12).

In 2004 and the preceding decade, piracy was rampant in Southeast Asia. Insecurity in the maritime region was exacerbated by the lack of navel capacities of governments to police their national waters and the impoverished state of local fishermen who needed another means of income (6). The region was responsible for the majority of the world’s pirate activity. The countries most affected- Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia- joined to promote regional security through the joint actions of sea patrols, coast watches, and shared intelligence (2). Operation MALSINDO consisted of maritime patrols and Operation EIS provided air surveillance for the Strait of Malacca (6). Government cooperation and organization was largely the reason for solving the pirate problem. Until 2009, levels of piracy in Southeast Asia were nearly negligible. Since 2010, piracy has increased in Southeast Asia because of pirates’ growing capabilities, higher concentration of shipping, the ability of piracy to alleviate poverty and the absence of coordination among littoral states to combat the problem (12).


West African Piracy
This encompasses Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Kenya, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring nations as piracy spreads.

            The Gulf of Guinea, stretching 5300 miles along the West Coast of Africa, is the piracy hotspot of the region. The Gulf’s states produce five billion barrels of oil per day (9). Nigeria’s immense oil wealth spurred its piracy problem because trade of this natural resource brought immense wealth disparity to the state. Poverty-stricken people began participating in criminal cartels to propel them from their poor economic conditions. Their aim is obtaining wealth, so oil tankers are usually the target of these attacks. Crews are taken hostage in extreme cases, but usually oil is looted and sold on the black market. Since ransoms are not the goal of these pirates, violence is escalated. Guns were used in 63% of attacks in 2012, the numbers having increased since 2011 (11).

This is a first hand account of a man taken by Nigerian pirates in late February 2013:

Cases are focused close to Lagos or within the Niger River Delta, where oil activities are focused. Nigeria’s rebel Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has been responsible foe a number of attacks of oil tankers in conjunction with pirate groups (8). Nigeria’s oil piracy poses a dangerous threat to the environment. Each day, the Gulf of Guinea ships 1.5 billion barrels of oil to the United States alone (13). In 2009 a Japanese oil tanker, the Takayama, was shot at off the coast of Somalia. The bullets pierced the tanks of oil onboard, causing a minor spill into the sea. While this instance was controlled, other occurrences of oil tankers being attacked by pirates could result in severe environmental damages if they were left for days or week without proper care.

There was a 33% increase in the number of reported acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in the first six months of 2012 as compared to the first half of 2011; pirates here cost on average two billion dollars annually (9). The Gulf of Guinea lacks any regulation by a multilateral regional cooperation of states, meaning that piracy will continue to expand.

This is an interesting Foreign Policy article that suggests that the Gulf of Guinea may overtake Somalia as the pirate hotspot in coming years: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/20/pirates_of_the_guinean?page=0,1

Pirate Tactics
While pirates in Africa use AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars, pirates operating in Southeast Asia use more rudimentary weapons and are usually less violent towards crews (7).  Southeast Asian pirates are generally armed with machetes and knives. Attacks are directed at all types of ships; pirates typically flag down a target vessel, board it, order the crew overboard, and then steal boat parts, cargos, and valuables before fleeing (10). Piratical acts occurring more recently in South America and the Caribbean are similar to those in Asia. Attacks in Columbia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Brazil have been characterized by the theft of ship’s stores without violence (11). Like Southeast Asian pirates, hostages are usually not taken and weapons are rudimentary. Antithetically, Gulf of Guinea pirates are violent and have killed and more often injured crewmembers with AK-47s, RPGs, and other automatic weapons (11). Unlike Somalian pirates who need their hostages to alive to receive a ransom, Nigerian pirates have less care for human life. 

Several conditions are conducive to piracy:
1.     The proximity of advantageous geographical features, islets, or remote costal areas that escape the authority of government
2.     The geo-economic conditions of the host country of the pirates (i.e. if the country is near major trade routes of has maritime capabilities)
3.     Weak, ineffective, or failed states do not operate properly and therefore do not enforce laws against piracy (3)
4.     Poverty forces people to obtain subsistence by lucrative means (7)
5.     Flaws or holes in maritime-transport treaties (7)
6.     Overlapping maritime boundaries (12)
7.     Knowledge that crews of most maritime ships were unarmed and vulnerable (7)
8.     Local authorities turning a blind eye to piratical activities because of the knowledge they will benefit
9.     Sophisticated weaponry, boats, and communications equipment (10)
10. Local knowledge of the waters
11. The view that piracy is an acceptable and integral part of the culture (12)

Piracy incurs global costs: It increases maritime transport costs because it forces ship owners to take less direct routes that avoid dangerous zones (3), there are higher fuel and labor costs, ships are limited to making fewer voyages (4), the insecurity of goods deliveries decreases trade opportunities and lead to declining investment (6), cargos are stolen (9), insurance is higher to transit through dangerous areas (9), and higher wages have to be paid because of the high risk (9). The trade loss due to piracy between Europe and Asia was 24.5 billion dollars in 2008 alone (6).  

These statistics and interactive maps show us that piracy is a serious matter, one of international scope. Pirates operate in waters around the world and are usually beyond the control of local governments. Maritime pirates are products of insecurity, and yet they produce insecurity.

The ICC International Maritime Bureau gives extensive quantitative and qualitative data on all attacks of piracy in 2012:

Works Cited:
(1) Abbot, Jason and Neil Renwick. “Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Societal Security in Southeast Asia.” In Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 11, No. 1 (1999): 7-24.
(2) Schuman, Michael. “How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait.” Times. April 22, 2009.
(3) Martinez-Zarzoso, Immaculada and Sami Benassi. “The Price of Modern Maritime Piracy.” In Deference and Peace Economics. (2013).
(4) Kraska, James. “Freakomics of Maritime Piracy.” Brown Jounral of World Affairs 16, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010).
(5) Middleton, Roger. “Trends in Piracy: A Global Problem with Somalia at the Core.” Africa Programme, Chatham House. (2010).
(6) Bensassi, Sami and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso. “How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community?” In Review of International Economics 20, No. 5 (2012): 869-883.
(7) Anyu, J. Ndumbe and Samuel Moki. “Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and Its Implications for Global Security.” From Mediterranean Quarterly 20, No. 3 (Summer 2009).
(8) Alessi, Christopher. “Combating Maritime Piracy.” Council on Foreign Relations. (March 23, 2012).
(9) Sullivan, Jimmie E. “Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Regional Challenges and Solutions.” Naval War College. (November 2012).
(10) Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. “Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines.” National Defense Research Institute. (2012).
(11) “Piracy and Armed Robert Against Ships.” ICC International Maritime Bureau. London, United Kingdom. (2012).
(12) Banlaoi, Rommel C. “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current Situation, Countermeasures, Achievements and Recurring Challenges.” Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research. (2012).