Piracy- A literary review

Piracy-A Literary Review

“In the immediate nearness of the gold, all else had been forgotten [...], and I could not doubt that he hoped to seize upon the treasure, find and board the Hispanola under cover of night, cut every honest throat about that island, and sail away as he had at first intended, laden with crimes and riches.”
― Robert L. Stevenson. “Treasure Island”

In contemporary world, when the word “pirate “is mentioned, images of Johnny Depp as Captain Jack Sparrow instantly come to mind. Media and film industry had done all possible to present image of piracy in a quite unrealistic, romanticized sense, not trying to emphasize the seriousness and make people think what is the real story behind the black flag.

Different authors have different approaches and different feelings about piracy. Let us turn back in time, and look shortly at piracy throughout history. Authors like Angus Konstam explored this from historical point of view claiming that piracy had always been an issue- connecting that one`s desire to explore, travel and use the benefits that sea has to offer. Geographical discoveries from 14^th-16^th centuries changed the way piracy worked. First, it widened the area in which piracy used to be a security problem. Technology, improvement in building ships, development of international market and colonialism in pre-capitalistic era n 17^th century evolved into golden age of piracy. Many authors argue that changing geopolitical picture in the world, as capitalism was about to take over changed the perception of piracy as a global issue. The Holly Alliance controlled politics in Europe and most of its colonies. In their resolutions they mention certain policies that were pursued by courts of Vienna and Berlin- great punishments for piracy and securing the trade companies, as well as intercontinental trade development. That had an impact on lowering danger coming from piracy as well as changing the way of life, and creating some different security problems.

Group of scholars from University of Novi Sad argued that piracy had never disappeared, no matter how the world we live in changed and affected creating different security threats. What has changed is policies and perception of piracy. Relationship between national versus human security is really significant in explaining maritime piracy. In the past, piracy affected kingdoms, empires, governments, trade and construction companies. Piracy was in the way of colonialism, and UK, Spain, Portugal, France and Netherlands were fighting with all their means.  It posed threat to a socio-economic system at the time.  To be a pirate – it meant stealing, crime, death, lack of humanity, but at the same time resistance, mythology and a legend. Yet, not all of the pirates wanted to be like Robin Hood and steal in the name of poor, oppressed nations. Contemporary perception of maritime is different, so are threats it poses, and what is affected by it. Colonialism doesn’t exist today, and the way the trade and international exchange of goods functions is quite different. Group of security scholars from Essex University had claimed that compared to “real” threats in today`s world WMDs, or terrorists, piracy is not the matter of global security.

But is that really a case? Acts of piracy in the modern world are significantly increasing and pose a great threat to the safety of maritime navigation, property and human lives. Right now, issue is centered on breakdown of the legal effects of piracy. International legal aspect (especially with reference to the Convention on the Law of the Sea) has the cumulative conditions that must be satisfied for the existence of treating this international crime at sea. Particularly relevant are measures of repression by the state. UN summit proposed some changes and progress in the classical notion of piracy, in order to more effectively combat this phenomenon of contemporary crime at sea. From the point of maritime law, the authors examine the basis of international conventions and domestic law with the act of piracy cases. Scholars are suggesting bigger institutional cooperation, as well as changing and strengthening implications of law in the international waters. Second option is strengthening implications of law in domestic coastline, and their cooperation with national institutions.

So, who exactly is affected by piracy? And why doesn’t more people react to threat of piracy? Picture we get from media is that everything becomes an issue when it affects USA. Or “white USA” at least. Piracy works on the principles of chokepoints- geographically and strategically convenient regions where trade with ships is still really active, and where regulations of International law don’t work as they should. Everything can be affected by piracy today- goods, oil, people. Even ordinary tourists can be potential target , because they are source of money. Maritime piracy is being treated differently by institutions and governments, and not all of them prioritize this as security issue, or not all of them can. Piracy today is definitely more matter of economical and human security, and it is more regional than global issue. Does that still mean we will not give our best to create valid policies to resolve this issue? People`s lives are still in game, and its proven that people who get captured by pirates suffer from trauma consequences long time after.

One thing is sure, with contemporary development of piracy, there is a  network of scholars and security experts and rising interest in resolving maritime piracy as security issue.

“What do you want to be a sailor for? There are greater storms in politics than you will ever find at sea. Piracy, broadsides, blood on the decks. You will find them all in politics.”
David L. George

“Not just the Spanish Main, love. The entire ocean. The entire wo'ld. Wherever we want to go, we'll go. That's what a ship is, you know. It's not just a keel and a hull and a deck and sails, that's what a ship needs but what a ship is... what the Black Pearl really is...What piracy really is…. is freedom. “

Captain Jack Sparrow

Sources:

“Pirate Wars” Peter Earle, Methuen – London, 1973

“Piracy- the complete history”  Angus Kostnam Osprey Publishing; First UK edition (August 19, 2008)

“International law” Rodoljub Etinski , JP “Sluzbeni glasnik” , 2010

Scope and Scale of Maritime Piracy: Somalia

Even as early as the Roman era, maritime piracy has demanded the attention of states and posed a serious threat to commerce, travel and security across the globe. In 2011, 439 reported pirate attacks around the world cost an estimated $7-12 billion[1]. Emerging trends of similarly astronomical numbers have captured the attention of world leaders in recent years, leading to a resurgence of concern regarding this ancient criminal act.

 Until the late 2000’s piracy had flown under the public radar  but nonetheless  persisted at small but steady rates in the seas of Southeast Asia prior to the development of reliable records on pirate activity.  By the 1980s the rising threat of piracy had warranted enough consideration to spark implementation of anti-piracy policies, notably the creation of the International Maritime Bureau and the UN Law of the Sea Convention.[2] These strategies were initially deemed successful in steadily reducing the total number of pirate attacks reported annually. However the dramas of modern piracy returned to prominence in 2007 when attacks around Africa surpassed those in Asian waters for the first time on record. This distinct leap was due primarily to the efforts of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, where through 2009 attacks accounted for 46% of the 322 events reported globally[3]. This record year was indicative of foundational shifts in maritime piracy resulting in fewer attacks worldwide, but a drastic surge in activity emanating from Somalia with grim economic consequences.

            While more than 20,000 ships containing some 12% of the worlds transported petroleum pass through the Gulf of Aden annually, the general breakdown of rule of law and fragility of parts of the Somali state make these waters a haven for maritime pirates . In 2007, a particularly turbulent regime shift further exacerbated Somalia’s failing stability by ousting the Islamic Courts Union in favor of the Transitional Federal Government. This threw the country into chaos and created an environment conducive to pirate activity by igniting civil unrest as well as by replacing the heavy-handed treatment of piracy by the ICU with an ineffective new government. To further enrich the prospects of sea-borne thieves, a barbaric civil war and the inability of the TFG to manage a mounting list of crises led to a massive influx of international aid in 2008. Some 95% of international aid supplies to Somalia is shipped by sea.  These supplies and an estimated 3.2 million Somalis, approximately 43% of the population, were dependent on food aid in the latter part of2008.

            The direct economic costs of Somali piracy, while difficult to assess reliably, affect both their targets and hosts in a multitude of ways. Most noticeably, the average costs of recovering hostages of Somali pirates skyrocketed from $150,000 in 2005 to $4.97 million in 2010. This trend imitated the rise in the complexity and audacity of pirate organizations as they pursued bigger vessels farther from their home shores. Other major contributors to the rising cost of maritime piracy include; loss of cargo, rising insurance rates for transport vessels, the costs of heightening naval and police presence, and the costs of re-routing ships to avoid dangerous waters. Piracy greatly impedes the flow of goods by sea, which constitutes more than 80% of world trade, and aggravates preexisting conditions of instability in a host nation. Foreign trade and investment are significantly deterred by pirate activity and the hijacking of humanitarian vessels makes foreign aid hesitant in returning. In sum these direct costs are estimated to be more than $10 billion annually and represent a significant threat to interstate trade and transport as well as domestic stability.

            In two decades since its international resurgence in the 1990’s, the scale of maritime piracy has shrunk globally, while its resurgence in Eastern Africa has caused it to realize greater destructive influence. Along Somalia’s coasts, the relatively few pirate gangs that existed prior to the new millennium accounted for only 5% of the total global incidents in 2000. By 2009, the waters were home to a multitude of gangs whose global share exceeded 50%.[4] The expansion of the territory Somali pirates prey upon has already created consequences for neighboring states like Kenya through a marked reduction in foreign investment and tourism in the entire region.   

                       

al., A. B. e. (2010, December 2010). "The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy." from http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf.

               

Chalk, P. (2010). "Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses." Brown Journal of World Affairs 16(2): 89-108.

               

Moki, J. N. A. a. S. (2009). "Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and Its Implications for Global Security." Mediterranean Quarterly 20(3): 95-121.

               

Section, S. a. T. A. (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. Vienna, United Nations office on Drugs and Crime: 193-200.

               

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[1] al., A. B. e. (2010, December 2010). "The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy." from http://oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/Cost%20of%20Piracy%20Final%20Report.pdf.

               

[2] Moki, J. N. A. a. S. (2009). "Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and Its Implications for Global Security." Mediterranean Quarterly 20(3): 95-121.

                I found this article useful in contextualizing the phenomena of African piracy in both history and current debates.  

[3] Chalk, P. (2010). "Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses." Brown Journal of World Affairs 16(2): 89-108.

               

[4] Section, S. a. T. A. (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. Vienna, United Nations office on Drugs and Crime: 193-200.

                This report from the UN was an excellent start to my research by presenting me with both statistical data and concise explanations of many key themes surrounding piracy. 

Piracy: Scope and Scale

Scope and Scale: Piracy as a Global Phenomenon

Maritime piracy is a multimillion-dollar criminal enterprise of vital concern to international maritime commerce and security of the communities it affects. Incidents of maritime piracy have been on the rise in recent decades. While contemporary news reporting may focus solely on the problem in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, piracy has transnational repercussions and operates along all major maritime trade routes. It faces no restrictions to where it can operate, and has plagued the waters of Asia, Africa, and South America. Piracy is a problem of human and national security that necessitates regional cooperation since it threatens international commercial interests and people.

This map is a live-action project conducted by the International Maritime Bureau that monitors international instances of piracy. Note the scale of the phenomenon in both 2013 and 2012.

http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map

Piracy has never been restricted to a single geographical location. Historically, pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries functioned in and around the Americas where and when large-scale navies were not yet established and colonies were too weak to repel them (1). Even further into antiquity, Phoenicians and Vikings conducted piratical enterprises in the Mediterranean and the North Sea/ Baltic Sea areas, respectively. Piracy in the Indian Ocean was characterized during colonial times by the intense maritime warring of both local pirates and Western European privateers. Further east, piracy in Southeast Asia was “guerrilla warfare at sea” between localities of Indonesia or Malaysia and Dutch naval power (1). As large navies became the norm in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, piracy became largely obsolete. However, the late 20^th and 21^st centuries have witnessed a proliferation of piratical acts around the world.

Pirates differ from those in history because they are now more sophisticated and organized. Their actions to overtake ships are systematic and carefully planned. Pirates who flood the seas with “sophisticated equipment, including speed boats, modern machine guns, communication devices, trawlers, barges, and oil industry backup ships” are extremely difficult to combat and they are therefore a serious security problem (7).

Southeast Asian and Indian Subcontinent Piracy

This region encompasses the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia

Map (https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcT8XzsWHD2Am2BlsrB-BGs_gbUunWyz_V79qt3i7n-0l8f9Xafizw)

The Strait of Malacca is 520 miles long and only 11 miles wide at its opening. Ships passing from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and Pacific have to travel through this narrow strait. Annually, about 40% of the world’s maritime trade on more than 50,000 vessels passes through this strait (2).

            Pirates can easily function in this area because

1.     Reduced speed through the narrow sea passages makes ships very vulnerable to attack.

2.     There are numerous negligible and remote islets in the area that function as sanctuaries for pirates.

3.     The area offers secret coves and places to hide away.

4.     The region accounts for 15.8% of the world’s total coastline, making it difficult for authorities to patrol (12).

In 2004 and the preceding decade, piracy was rampant in Southeast Asia. Insecurity in the maritime region was exacerbated by the lack of navel capacities of governments to police their national waters and the impoverished state of local fishermen who needed another means of income (6). The region was responsible for the majority of the world’s pirate activity. The countries most affected- Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia- joined to promote regional security through the joint actions of sea patrols, coast watches, and shared intelligence (2). Operation MALSINDO consisted of maritime patrols and Operation EIS provided air surveillance for the Strait of Malacca (6). Government cooperation and organization was largely the reason for solving the pirate problem. Until 2009, levels of piracy in Southeast Asia were nearly negligible. Since 2010, piracy has increased in Southeast Asia because of pirates’ growing capabilities, higher concentration of shipping, the ability of piracy to alleviate poverty and the absence of coordination among littoral states to combat the problem (12).

West African Piracy

This encompasses Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Kenya, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, and other neighboring nations as piracy spreads.

Map (https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgz-v90rWuORgzEZkyjA08wC62bleE_SsIABHV6LppSEOc4pg6mlS9gU195EJHLH9urhJLskzQo2_gegpmiCtWelvUL0iS5PZjNCrtgYgmDsEuqsTw6qg1p2E9mtK0pu5XkOkcT1aSIALSa/s1600/gulf+guinea)

            The Gulf of Guinea, stretching 5300 miles along the West Coast of Africa, is the piracy hotspot of the region. The Gulf’s states produce five billion barrels of oil per day (9). Nigeria’s immense oil wealth spurred its piracy problem because trade of this natural resource brought immense wealth disparity to the state. Poverty-stricken people began participating in criminal cartels to propel them from their poor economic conditions. Their aim is obtaining wealth, so oil tankers are usually the target of these attacks. Crews are taken hostage in extreme cases, but usually oil is looted and sold on the black market. Since ransoms are not the goal of these pirates, violence is escalated. Guns were used in 63% of attacks in 2012, the numbers having increased since 2011 (11).

This is a first hand account of a man taken by Nigerian pirates in late February 2013:

http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2013/03/03/travelogue-my-experience-with-nigerian-pirates/

Cases are focused close to Lagos or within the Niger River Delta, where oil activities are focused. Nigeria’s rebel Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has been responsible foe a number of attacks of oil tankers in conjunction with pirate groups (8). Nigeria’s oil piracy poses a dangerous threat to the environment. Each day, the Gulf of Guinea ships 1.5 billion barrels of oil to the United States alone (13). In 2009 a Japanese oil tanker, the Takayama, was shot at off the coast of Somalia. The bullets pierced the tanks of oil onboard, causing a minor spill into the sea. While this instance was controlled, other occurrences of oil tankers being attacked by pirates could result in severe environmental damages if they were left for days or week without proper care.

There was a 33% increase in the number of reported acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in the first six months of 2012 as compared to the first half of 2011; pirates here cost on average two billion dollars annually (9). The Gulf of Guinea lacks any regulation by a multilateral regional cooperation of states, meaning that piracy will continue to expand.

This is an interesting Foreign Policy article that suggests that the Gulf of Guinea may overtake Somalia as the pirate hotspot in coming years: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/20/pirates_of_the_guinean?page=0,1

Pirate Tactics

While pirates in Africa use AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars, pirates operating in Southeast Asia use more rudimentary weapons and are usually less violent towards crews (7).  Southeast Asian pirates are generally armed with machetes and knives. Attacks are directed at all types of ships; pirates typically flag down a target vessel, board it, order the crew overboard, and then steal boat parts, cargos, and valuables before fleeing (10). Piratical acts occurring more recently in South America and the Caribbean are similar to those in Asia. Attacks in Columbia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Brazil have been characterized by the theft of ship’s stores without violence (11). Like Southeast Asian pirates, hostages are usually not taken and weapons are rudimentary. Antithetically, Gulf of Guinea pirates are violent and have killed and more often injured crewmembers with AK-47s, RPGs, and other automatic weapons (11). Unlike Somalian pirates who need their hostages to alive to receive a ransom, Nigerian pirates have less care for human life. 

Several conditions are conducive to piracy:

1.     The proximity of advantageous geographical features, islets, or remote costal areas that escape the authority of government

2.     The geo-economic conditions of the host country of the pirates (i.e. if the country is near major trade routes of has maritime capabilities)

3.     Weak, ineffective, or failed states do not operate properly and therefore do not enforce laws against piracy (3)

4.     Poverty forces people to obtain subsistence by lucrative means (7)

5.     Flaws or holes in maritime-transport treaties (7)

6.     Overlapping maritime boundaries (12)

7.     Knowledge that crews of most maritime ships were unarmed and vulnerable (7)

8.     Local authorities turning a blind eye to piratical activities because of the knowledge they will benefit

9.     Sophisticated weaponry, boats, and communications equipment (10)

10. Local knowledge of the waters

11. The view that piracy is an acceptable and integral part of the culture (12)

Piracy incurs global costs: It increases maritime transport costs because it forces ship owners to take less direct routes that avoid dangerous zones (3), there are higher fuel and labor costs, ships are limited to making fewer voyages (4), the insecurity of goods deliveries decreases trade opportunities and lead to declining investment (6), cargos are stolen (9), insurance is higher to transit through dangerous areas (9), and higher wages have to be paid because of the high risk (9). The trade loss due to piracy between Europe and Asia was 24.5 billion dollars in 2008 alone (6).  

These statistics and interactive maps show us that piracy is a serious matter, one of international scope. Pirates operate in waters around the world and are usually beyond the control of local governments. Maritime pirates are products of insecurity, and yet they produce insecurity.

The ICC International Maritime Bureau gives extensive quantitative and qualitative data on all attacks of piracy in 2012:

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.harbourmaster.org%2Fdownloadfile.php%3Fdf%3Dimages%2Fupload%2Ffiles%2Fnews-maritime_news_file_237.pdf%26dfn%3DMjAxMiBRMiBJTUIgUGlyYWN5IFJlcG9ydCBBQlJJREdFRC5&ei=vpZUUdDiOurM0wHE14HwDQ&usg=AFQjCNFairPtXn6ELU-35dLvEZm5e3OTWA&sig2=YyNKK6HA_NQavD0zs9EkGw&bvm=bv.44442042,d.dmQ

Works Cited:

(1) Abbot, Jason and Neil Renwick. “Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Societal Security in Southeast Asia.” In Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 11, No. 1 (1999): 7-24.

(2) Schuman, Michael. “How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait.” Times. April 22, 2009.

(3) Martinez-Zarzoso, Immaculada and Sami Benassi. “The Price of Modern Maritime Piracy.” In Deference and Peace Economics. (2013).

(4) Kraska, James. “Freakomics of Maritime Piracy.” Brown Jounral of World Affairs 16, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010).

(5) Middleton, Roger. “Trends in Piracy: A Global Problem with Somalia at the Core.” Africa Programme, Chatham House. (2010).

(6) Bensassi, Sami and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso. “How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community?” In Review of International Economics 20, No. 5 (2012): 869-883.

(7) Anyu, J. Ndumbe and Samuel Moki. “Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and Its Implications for Global Security.” From Mediterranean Quarterly 20, No. 3 (Summer 2009).

(8) Alessi, Christopher. “Combating Maritime Piracy.” Council on Foreign Relations. (March 23, 2012).

(9) Sullivan, Jimmie E. “Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Regional Challenges and Solutions.” Naval War College. (November 2012).

(10) Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. “Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines.” National Defense Research Institute. (2012).

(11) “Piracy and Armed Robert Against Ships.” ICC International Maritime Bureau. London, United Kingdom. (2012).

(12) Banlaoi, Rommel C. “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current Situation, Countermeasures, Achievements and Recurring Challenges.” Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research. (2012).

Defining Piracy

            Most of us likely already have a solid understanding of the definition of piracy on a basic level, as maritime robbery. For the purpose of our in-depth issue area investigation however, it is essential that we analyze various definitions and potential mechanisms of categorization in order to identify a consensus definition, which encompasses all of the factors we wish to consider. In order to settle upon a satisfactory definition let us consider the definition of piracy decided upon at the UN Convention on Laws of the Seas (UNCOLS), the definition posed by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and finally, a categorization scheme to identify the different types of pirate actors we see adapted from categories of maritime crime proposed by Dana R. Dillon, a senior policy analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation

(Note: While the writer acknowledges the existence of piracy in forms other than maritime, for example aircraft piracy, or the piracy of copyrighted works or ideas such as software and literature, this investigation focuses primarily on piracy as it relates to physical theft or assault, especially that which is seaborne. While a case may be made for the relevance of the piracy of intellectual property to human security, the piracy group decided to focus its study on piracy in the context of maritime law due to its larger contribution to the study of security in a holistic sense.)

            

            Before launching into the task of defining piracy, let us consider why the issue at hand is a concern in the field of security. Not only does piracy pose the very obvious threats to the individual human security of those who are vulnerable to pirate attack while on the Straits of Malacca or off the coast of Somalia, it also poses great economic threats. For example, global commerce is negatively impacted by piracy due to decreased efficiency when good shipments are prevented/interrupted or when trade lanes become unusable. Piracy also has economic ramifications in relation to ransom payments as well as fees for increased ship security and including guards on vessels. Most importantly, piracy threatens the lives of both naval crews and civilians, and acts as another arena for terrorism, similar to aviation hijacking. (1)

          Now, to move on to defining piracy: According to the UNCLOS definition, “Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

 (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

            (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such                ship or aircraft;

            (ii)against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place

            outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act

described in subparagraph (a) or (b). (2)

            At first glace this definition, found in Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS, seems relatively inclusive, however, it restricts the definition of piracy to include only those acts of aggression that take place on the high seas, and outside the jurisdiction of any state. According to this definition acts that occur within a state’s territorial waters are considered armed robbery at sea, not piracy. This is clearly problematic because defining piracy in this way ignores all cases that seemingly fit the bill: illegal acts of violence against a private ship, but occurred either in ports or in territorial waters, which fall under state jurisdiction. In 2003, only 27% of the more than 450 reported pirate attacks were covered under the UNCLOS; the remaining 330 maritime attacks took place in waters under state jurisdiction and therefore, according to UNCLOS, were not piracy. (3) While this definition covers an adequate variety of actions to be considered piracy (illegal acts of violence on the high seas or on board an aircraft, act of voluntary participation in pirate ship operation, intentionally facilitating an act considered piracy, etc), when utilized in isolation, it is simply not sufficient.  

              The definition followed by the IMB is based largely upon that of the UNCLOS, however, expands to include attempted attacks and is not limited to ships on the high seas. The IMB characterizes piracy as:
 “An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.” (4)
            
            On its own this definition too, has evident flaws, namely failure to consider all relevant actors in piracy. We can come to understand these shortcomings by considering the various actors that commit the crimes of piracy.  Dana R. Dillon , a senior policy analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation separates maritime crime into four different categories. I propose that these categories are a great way to breakdown the different actors we can consider to be pirates. Firstly, there are “real pirates” in the traditional sense… the armed men who board ships while they are at sea. These pirates are typically relatively well organized and equipped for the task at hand. They are generally economically motivated. (3)  Pirates of Somalia are a prime modern example of what falls into this first category: they are oftentimes poor fishermen whose livelihoods have been negatively impacted by overfishing in the area. (5) Further, there are heavily armed and oftentimes, “surprisingly well-organized, down to having their own packets of paperwork -- on letterhead -- for their victims.” (6)
           
             Other candidates for committing crimes of piracy are dockworkers and fishermen, or those who simply have the opportunity to steal the unsecured stores of docked shipped. These “opportunistic pirates” are similarly economically motivated but have very different means from traditional pirates. (3) It is important to keep in mind that while these actors do constitute a branch of piracy, the outcomes they cause are not nearly as significant as those caused by real pirates and terrorist pirates. For this reason, they must be clearly identified as a lesser threat. 
            
            Finally, it is important to consider maritime terrorists are candidates of piracy. Their means are far more similar to traditional pirates than they are to those of opportunistic pirates albeit oftentimes less organized and less trained than the former. These “terrorist pirates” are largely motivated by political goals rather than economical. (3) An example of this type of pirates is the Sri Lankan Sea Tigers, a branch of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist organization, who, beginning in 1980, targeted Sri Lankan naval ships to destroy vessels and kill soldiers. The motivations are the LTTE are largely political and center upon the desire of the separatist militant group to create an independent state for ethnic Tamil people. 
            
          So, if neither of the definitions, nor Dillon’s categorization scheme is adequate in defining piracy on its own, what consensus can we come to that will enable us to study this issue area with focus and purpose? We must combine aspects of each component considered above in order to be thorough investigators. Thus our consensus is as follows: maritime piracy is an act of, participation in, or incitement of violence, detention or theft against a ship on the high seas, in state territorial waters, or docked in a port, committed  by private actors falling into one of four categories: “real (traditional) pirates,” “opportunistic pirates,” or “terrorist pirates.”

Works Cited

(1) http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol36/iss1/3/

(2) http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

(3) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v025/25.1dillon.html#authbio
(4) http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=%22piracy%20and%20armed%20robbery%20against%20ships%2C%22%20annual%20report%2C%20international%20chamber%20of%20commerce%2C%20international%20maritime%20bureau%2C%20jan.%201-dec.%2031%2C%202003%2C%203&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffin.nepia.com%2Fmodules%2Fassetlibrary%2Fz_extra%2FgetAsset.php%3Ftype%3Dfile%26id%3D1238&ei=xzJSUaq_B8Wx0QHfq4Bg&usg=AFQjCNHLfSzmoZTU-Hw5hQvapGlipiRoow&bvm=bv.44342787,d.dmQ

(5) http://www.africaecon.org/index.php/exclusives/read_exclusive/1/1

(6) http://www.businessinsider.com/somali-pirates-are-surprisingly-organized-2012-8

(7) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HH31Df01.html

Scale and Scope of Proxy Wars by Greg Bissell

Scale and Scope of Proxy wars

Proxy wars were commonplace during late 1700’s and even in the times of the Vikings, and once again became popularized during the cold war to combat communism and to prevent the domino theory from becoming a reality. Through the use of third party combatants, both the United States and the Soviet Union were able to engage each other without actual combat and the use of nuclear weapons. Generally, the third party combatants that were fighting were rebel groups that sided with one or the other super powers, mercenaries, and religious groups, etc.  Examples of proxy wars are the Vietnam War, French/ Indian wars, the Afghan–Soviet war and the Syrian civil war. Even though the cold war has been over for more than 20 years, proxy wars still seem to spring forth.

Proxy wars are still fought today, though they are not between super powers or communists and democratic governments. Today’s proxy wars are fought between the West and its allies against Islamic militants and its supporters. Motives such as political, religious, and ideological states will fund these third party surrogates through whatever means they can afford. Even after the cold war, the United States, the emerged hegemonic power, has proxies chambered in its arsenal. Unlike proxy wars of the past, which prevented all out wars, the overall goals have changed.

Today Proxy wars throughout the world are used to keep whichever ideology, religious, or political groups in power. According to Al Jazeera, the United States is sponsoring countries from all over the world through means of military training, joint operations exercises with special forces and providing arms and information. Through these methods it helps support the U.S., and the West’s ideals of democracy and interests. This, of course is without having U.S. troops on the ground or at the very least limited numbers which keep U.S. soldier deaths to a minimum.

The Obama presidency has created the largest influx of proxy wars in Africa. U.S. funds have been stepped up from Libya, all the way to fight rebels like the Lords Resistance Army moving in various parts of Africa. The U.S has supplied regional drone campaigns, provided arms, supplies, logistics, and money.  This does not extend to Somalia, where the, “CIA campaign against Islamist al-Shabab militants that include intelligence operations, training for Somali agents, a secret prison, helicopter attacks and commando raids. Now, it is also backing a classic proxy war using African surrogates.”

Syria is a country that has the potential of facing a proxy war. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War rebel factions have been calling on the United States to supply them with “aid” in their fight against Bashar Al Assad. So far the United States has only provided communications equipment.  On the other side of the fence, the Russians are reluctant to give up their last military base in the Middle East, thus they help to maintain Assad’s military. Syria is a prime example of one of the last cold war proxies. Both the U.S. and its old foe Russia are battling it out, except this time diplomatically and over different ideological differences than the old domino theory. To prevent another Middle Eastern country from falling into the hands of Islamic radicalism the U.S. is trying to sponsor a group that will best suit the U.S. and Western ideals. The Russian’s on the other hand don’t want to give up their last foothold to the West in order to remain a global player. China is also helping Russia to maintain power via diplomatic engagements against the U.S.

Although Proxy wars have changed in terms of the cold war, as in the old standard of preventing a nuclear holocaust, proxies still seem relevant in the world today just under a different guise. Proxies have new enemies and old foes still vying for support. The main difference is that is that the enemy is not a super power; they are often non-state actors or small unstable states. The duration of proxies and how they are used is also different; they can start before a major player decides to enter a war or at the end of a war when a major power leaves and funds the war from its own country.

http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/institutional/newsletters/strategic%20insight/2010/Craig10.pdf

http://dpsa.dk/papers/On%20Proxy%20War.pdf

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/10/advice_to_the_us_on_syria

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/20128128345053728.html