Monday, February 25, 2013

Proxy Wars: ‘Proxy Groups’ Literature Review




Proxy Wars were once used to describe the ability of a Global Superpower to utilize a smaller state into completing their bidding. This was usually associated with a goal of a regime shift, and would seek out a transfer of power. However, with the post Cold War era came the birth of non-state actors that required scholars to reexamine the standard definition of Proxy Wars. In the past these wars were usually associated with the use of a third party actor, and it normally took into consideration the intent of ruling. Due to the large disparity in the standard of intent among non-state actors we must question whether agendas should belong in the modern definition of Proxy Wars.

Although there have been numerous occasions in which states have worked with non-state actors during conflicts, there are a few instances that I would like to focus in on and the four are: Syria and Hezbollah, Iran and the Mahdi Army, the United States and the United Islamic Front, and lastly NATO and the right to intervene. When looking at all of these situations there exists a common thread, and that thread wraps itself around ideological incompatibility among reasons of long and short term goals set by the States who choose to use non-state groups.

1. Hezbollah: This case unlike the other three will be used to demonstrate a case of ideological incompatibility. At the same time this is an example of a state trying to use a non-state proxy (NSP) to achieve long-term goals. The risk lies in the influence this new strong actor brings to the subsequent neighboring government theaters, both in relation to unpredictability but also in relation to the possible power shifts. Iran’s relationship with the Hezbollah is both strategic and ideological. Similar to the Hezbollah, Iran is also Shiite. As part of the pan-Muslim movement, Iran was pressing to spread its ideological influence to the Shiite Muslims in southern Lebanon, and while building up Hezbollah, it motivated the desire to put force on northern Israel. Therefore, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard helped teach the Hezbollah how to organize itself into an army, providing intelligence, explosives, engineering knowledge, and communications. Although the Hezbollah in the past have been rather coy with their response toward an attack on their sponsors, they now however declare that they will find it difficult to stand aside if Israel or the United States bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities. It has become an apparent that the Hezbollah now act in accordance to Iran’s ideology and continues to fight for a regime shift.
Some more readings:
2. Iran and The Mahdi Army: To supporters of the Mahdi Army, it was believed that they acted as the military muscle of Iraq’s Urban Shia Muslims, fighting to protect Shia parts of the country. It was created in the summer of 2003, and was prompted by radical Iraqi cleric Moqtada Sadr, who spoke in his sermons the need of a new prevention force. Quickly after young men were being recruited near mosques to ‘defend’ the Shia Muslim faith and their country. The force of the Mehdi Army was first felt in the later year when rocket propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, and other weapons, which had been uncommon to the normal Iraqi encounter. It later surfaced that the United States accused Iran, a Shia spiritual ally, of training, financing, and supplying the Mahdi Army forces. Here is another example of ideological compatibility.  Here the state uses the NSP to achieve short-term goals of eliminating a foreign presence in support of ideology, and like the Syrian case the NSPs are employed to deal with external actors
Cases in which States are in search of world order:
3. US and The United Islamic Front (a.k.a. The Northern Alliance): This is a case where the non-state proxy is used to obtain a short-term goal, the ousting of the Taliban. The United Islamic Front was a military front that came into existence shortly after the Taliban took over Kabul. Although the front began as a very small entity, it quickly grew as Iran, Russia, India, and other nations began to poor resources into its cause. The United Islamic Front however saw most of its prowess after the bombings of September eleventh. With air support from the United States led forces, the front succeeded in retaking Kabul back from the Taliban. When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked for a comment on ‘forces against the Taliban he stated that the United States would be helping the Northern Alliance and other Taliban opposition groups. The US forces have focused in assisting with targeting, logistics, medical assistance and communications. The following period shows inadequacies in using the non-state proxies and a need to put 'boots on the ground' which could be related to a shift in political goals. Here again the issue of empowerment is raised. This is also a case in which supplies and support from a foreign power are fed into a non-state group in relation to quelling an internal threat that highly mirrors ideological interests.
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44481
4. US/NATO: Unlike the other cases, this one is rather broad and is not in reflection of a specific event, but rather it surrounds the idea of global intervention. While this case is rather different it does share similarities to the other cases involving world order supporter states.  Like the other non-state proxies, NATO and intervening forces are usually brought into failed states or rather into conflicts in which they are meant to impose law. Although it can be assumed that these foreign actors can be considered a third party, but we must realize that when dealing with intervention there is still always a goal or ideal that is to be achieved. This goal will subsequently usually overlap with a current actor, and a quasi alliance forms. For explanation purposes, assume that State A falls into civil war and becomes Side A and Side B. Due to the extent of this civil war NATO decides to send peacekeepers, and these actors begin to work to bring Side A back into unison, you see that these peacekeepers have essentially become a proxy non-state actor.  It is here that we see that there exists first an ideological compatibility, before support and action become an influence. This is again an example of using NSP in regards to internal enemies.
As seen in the four cases above, the purpose and agendas of non-state actors are highly erratic, and usually become players for larger states. This poses an interesting argument because although states, such as Iran, may pour money or resources into an organization, seeing as they are self-ruled a state can have their ideals imposed elsewhere without being strongly rebuked in the wake of conflicts. Non-state actors have become a growing force and global attention should be brought towards the role that they currently play and will continue to play. In the past, during the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union would implement smaller states, which one would believe they needed to believe they were acting alongside the ‘winner’. However, as we see today, in the presented examples and in current affairs that it has become much easier and much more readily available to interact with a non-state group when imposing ideals.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Proxy Wars: Definition

For the sake of this discussion, proxy wars will be defined as wars in which the main actors face conflict through the use of other means—proxies. These proxies range from aid and arms supplies to full use of troops, not simply the act of war itself; there are many ways for outside forces to contribute to war and conflict between entities other than itself. Proxy war is covert and illegal, yet still frequently used as a strategy today.

Proxy wars were first defined by the way they manifested during the era of the Cold War: indirect confrontation between superpowers via substitute actors. These substitute actors could be smaller states or non-state actors. The intended purpose of proxy wars was to avoid an all-out nuclear war between the Cold War era superpowers.  One of the well known examples of this type of proxy war is the Vietnam War. Vietnam was split by fighting between the communist state of North Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam. North Vietnam was backed by allies such as China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, while the U.S. was heavily involved in the defense of South Vietnam, to the extent that it was considered a puppet state (nominally sovereign but effectively controlled by a foreign power).
It was expected that proxy wars would stop being the modus operandi once US hegemony was established post-Cold War; however, it continues to be a strategy both for lesser states and for the U.S.

A second usage of the term refers to war between regional states in which external states directly intervene in the case that one of the regional states falls. It is considered proxy warfare because the main conflict involves “State A” and “State B”, but when  “State C” takes over fighting for “State B” after its fall, it becomes a war by proxy. It does not take place on the territory of the intervening state and they were concerned with the advancement of the intervening state rather than that of the smaller states; this intervention does not have to be contiguous with conflict between “State C” and “State A” whereas the prior war between States A and B most likely was rooted in prior tension between the states. Both sides need not be proxies in this definition. The current Syrian conflict has the potential to become this type of proxy war should the U.S. attempt to intervene on the side of the Syrian Opposition Coalition.

The development of non-state actors in the post-Cold War era challenges this primordial definition of proxy wars, as the original definition was based on state interaction. Modern non-state actors do not necessarily want to take over territory or a government; most use the expanding global communication network to levy resources (human or otherwise) and generate wealth and political/ideological power.
What this does to the traditional definition of proxy wars is that it removes the assumption that regime change (as seen in the Cold War) is the ultimate goal behind initiating proxy wars; non-state actors have unconventional agendas when compared to the agendas of states.

The definition used here begs a few questions: Are all situations where one state intervenes on behalf of another proxy wars?
Because of this, it is important to differentiate between proxy wars and wartime alliances, otherwise one risks broadly defining all wars as proxy if one state calls on the forces of another state to assist in conflict with a third state. The issue here is with power differentials: can a weak state make a proxy of a stronger state? Does the state interfering become the proxy for the state that called for reinforcements?
 

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/10/02/irans_role_in_iraq_too_complex_for_academic_shorthand/


http://dpsa.dk/papers/On%20Proxy%20War.pdf http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/institutional/newsletters/strategic%20insight/2010/Craig10.pdf

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&sqi=2&ved=0CIcBEBYwCg&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcac.sagepub.com%2Fcontent%2F19%2F4%2F263.full.pdf&ei=huAiUdffHKLi0gG0ooHYCA&usg=AFQjCNH9V5h59Q0O64k35ZOquRIPMt_gLQ&bvm=bv.42553238,d.cWE


Monday, February 11, 2013

Scope and Scale: Mercenaries and Militias

Have you investigated the scale (or scope) of the issue/phenomenon? Broadly speaking: how widespread is this “problem”? How many people/groups/states/regions are currently affected by it, and to what extent? Obviously, enumerating things like this depends on the definition used (see above) – so, how does varying the definition changes the answer to this scale/scope issue, and what can we make of that?
“Traditionally, ‘mercenaries’ were soldiers hired to fight in an armed conflict or to overthrow a Government, but in recent conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, Governments had used foreign fighters against their own populations.” Says Faiza Patel the United Nations Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights of peoples to self-determination.
Under the UN definition, mercenaries per-say are located in parts of Africa and Latin America, more specifically Colombia, Sierra Leon and Uganda, many of which are hired by the State or companies. These mercenaries are mostly made up of foreigners who are paid to protect and participate in an armed conflict. In Colombia’s case particularly, private security companies (PSCs) have participated in an armed conflict, does that make them mercenaries? The line between what can be and not be considered a contracted private security company or a mercenary group is hazy because these groups have a tendency to engage in illegal scenarios.
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http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gashc4023.doc.htm

Iraq, U.A.E, Libya, Somalia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Mali, Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America has at some point over the past 100 years employed or housed mercenaries and private armies. The problem is to call a group of armed combants 'mercenaries' they must be considered by the international community an illegal armed group working for a state or a firm. G4S, for example, is the second largest private employer in the world hired by the American government to protect non-military convoys in Iraq but the company also has deals with 125 countries, is hired by firms in some of the most dangerous parts of Africa and Latin America providing heavily armed security, landmine clearance, military intelligence and training. 
While PSCs are being paid to protect and not engage in open hostilities they can fall into combat easily. If the official army of the host country, for instance, were to attack a convoy of civilians that is protected by a private security company during a time of war, is the army’s attack on the convoy by the rules of international laws considered legal engagement? Are private security personnel allowed to engage in this form of combat?
In 2009, Blackwater-known as Xe- under a U.S. goverment contract got involved in what is considered an illegal military engagement caused by a car that refused to stop, in response 17 civilians where killed in Baghdad. The United States has since been more cautious when dealing with these private security companies but that does not mean that they do not have them scattered around Iraq. More-importantly, most of these PSCs are often found in conflict and war zones. The French Foreign Legions, for instance, are hired soldiers to protect French interests over seas but by the UN definition are considered mercenaries. Needless to say, the French Legions are exempt under the clauses 47 of the UN Protocol, which is no suprise given that France is one of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. Contractors like the CIA have in the past been responsible hiring mercenaries to operate and intervene in other countries affaris. To learn more go to
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/mercenaries-cia-expanded-role-contractors-legitimate/story?id=9302651
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http://en.legion-etrangere.com/index.php?block=0&titre=french-foreign-legion

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http://www.businessinsider.com/bi-mercenary-armies-2012-2?op=1
 
Militias, on the other hand, are typically considered armed groups like the Taliban, Hezbollah and FARC, who are generally found in the Middle East and Latin America. They are politically driven but have been associated with forms of terrorism. Hezbollah, in particular has widespread network, training civilians and insurgents in Brazil, Venezuela and the Southern Cone. The United States, similarly, has militias that are anti-government and are scattered through the west coast and south of the United States. Given how broad the definition of militias is, there is a lot of room to speculate who can be considered a militia, but militias in theory are civilians taking part in an armed conflict, and they are generally found wherever there is a military conflict or political instability. 
http://archive.adl.org/learn/ext_us/militia_m.asp?xpicked=4

Watch documentary:
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Sunday, February 10, 2013


Militias: A Literature Review
               
Many modern schools of thought on militias are rooted in the Theory of Social Contract. Rousseau first stressed the security contract between the people and the state or other security organ. Because  in a Hobbesian world there is no guaranteeing safety, people must sacrifice their ‘partial freedom’ for ‘secured freedom’, which is done in the form of a security contract. The state requires a monopoly on force to handle the competing pressures and forces in society; yet, the provider of secured freedom is not always the state, in fact it is often another entity such as a militia. What happens when certain interests and pressures are misrepresented or mishandled?

Genes Jones Yoroms argues that when there is an absence of democracy, rule of law, and social justice the environment is ripe for the emergence of militias. The state is not always impartial in social conflicts and thus the legitimate power of the state is called into question by social forces, often those that are misrepresented. When the state no longer benefits those who brought her into existence the national security becomes the security of the sovereign alone, and no longer the people or general will. In many modern states where militias thrive it then becomes important to focus on human security. If the state can provide the basic essentials of human security, the populace will be less likely to dissolve their security contract with state and turn to others for security. In essence when the legitimacy of the state is put into question militias materialize to challenge the state. A classic example of this in American history is the Minute Men. The people of the Thirteen Colonies did not feel that the British were operating in their interest and often directly against it, the colonists then started to question British rule culminating in the mobilization of the Minute Men as British Redcoats marched to Concord, MA in search of arms, thus starting the American Revolution.

In contemporary scholarly arenas there are three prominent schools of thought on militias, both with deep roots in the Theory of Social Contract. The first is the State-Centric Theory of Militias. In this theory there are two types of militias, First Generation and Second Generation militias. The First Generation operates in strong, robust states, and conducts itself on behalf of the state. They are largely volunteers who are community soldiers. They often commit to short-term training programs so that their day-to-day life is not all that affected. First Generation militias are defined as only soldiers on occasion and only called up in times of necessity, or when the normal state security apparatus is ineffective. Second Generation militias arise in response to state failure. While the state may be raising its armed forces to defend the general will of the people, it may also be confronting other social components not willing to concede to the general will that  guides the state. These other social forces produce their own militias and challenge the state. At a certain point the state can no longer sustain itself by coercion as much as it can no longer earn the confidence of the people. In State-Centric Theory of Militias this is due to four reasons. 1) the decision-making process of the state is no longer effective. 2) The rule of law is no longer relevant because of the absence of state cohesion. 3) The state cannot guarantee the security of its populace. 4) The supply of security form the state has become ineffective. Under these circumstances Second Generation militias thrive to challenge the state.

The Non-State Theory categorizes militias into a few groups. First there are militias that are socially guaranteed by the state to perform some functions on behalf of the state, these include community militias that identify with and operate in a certain area. There are also party militias that are raised by a certain political party who carry out the will of that party, sometimes against the interests of the state as a whole. Civil society militias are those that not associated with the prior two mentioned. Depending on the situation they can be tolerated and encouraged by the state while in other circumstances they are not. These militias can be ethnic, religious, labor, and ideological. Unlike community militias, civil society militias operate over vast expanses as well as in pockets because they are linked by forces other than a community. Overall the Non-state theory is defined by the fact that it is a private force. Following the theory of social contract, it is an illegitimate force established by groups to withstand the legitimate exercise of the use of force by the state. Non-state militias start by establishing cells for political education to raise and indoctrinate members. Their goal is often to make the state ungovernable to draw attention to their cause or plight. These militias have concrete goals and are much more organized than the militias we'll see in the next school of thought.

A third modern theory surrounding militias is known as the Fluid Theory, this school of thought primarily focuses on non-state militias. Fluid militias develop as a result of social and economic conflagration in the state and are generally defined in terms of the characteristic traits of their members. Their objectives are often not clear and use crude forms of terror to express their demands. A good example is the Revolutionary Force in Sierra Leone where rebels had no focus but to cause mayhem to the the general public. Under this lens there are three primary types of militias, mercenarian-militias, vigilante-militias, and criminal-militias. Mercenarian-militias are groups of armed men whose purpose could be for war-profit in addition to fighting for a cause. Criminal militias are mostly juvenile delinquents; they are often brought into these organizations and have little idea what they are fighting for. Criminal militiamen are brought up in a weak society and can become rapid defenders of a cause they may not totally believe in. In Nigeria they are the Area Boys, Yan Daba and Yan Banga. Vigilante-militia involves a security contract between them and the community they are defending. They arise to depend their community from a certain threat. Unfortunately they often turn into criminal militias besides the mandate given to them by their community to keep vigil. The armed groups that classified under the Fluid Theory can be state-created but more often emerge as opponents of the state.

Based on the Theory of Social Contract these three theories have emerged in modern scholarly circles, and continue to dominate the debate while their other less prominent theories that are given less attention.


 Further Reading:
Ake, C. (1992), in Julius Ihonvbere, (ed.) The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected works of Claude Ake, Jad Publishers, Lagos.
Francis, David J. Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace? N.p.: Ashgate Pub, n.d. Print.



Modern Mercenaries – Theory and Practice


The United States uses Private Military Contractors (sometimes called Private Security Contractors) in both armed and unarmed functions in combat zones, most notably during the war in Iraq.  The armed functions include security for convoys, buildings, and individual personnel as needed.  Unarmed functions include intelligence analysis, communications coordination, and security training provided to the Iraqi security forces.  

Report for Congress on PMCs in Iraq: http://tinyurl.com/al9v7a3

The PMCs have never been intended to replace combat troops in Iraq, instead they are meant to augment security operations so that the armed forces stationed in Iraq can perform combat roles instead of dividing manpower and resources between security and operations.  The combat realities of Iraq do not fit this ideal.  Security forces have been forced to engage attackers in contexts similar to those of active duty troops.  The enemy forces do not distinguish between contractors and soldiers and will attack all American installations and personnel.  Security contractors increasingly found themselves in the same situations as combat troops.

Najaf 2004: Blackwater Security defending a building compound
            tinyurl.com/axlrewj
Ramadi 2011: United States Marines in shootout with Iraqi Insurgents
            tinyurl.com/adhf8vt

No Place at Home

Most PMCs hire contractors in a three tier system: Tier 1 is made up of former special forces and other highly trained soldiers from elite units.  Tier 2 is made up of logistics supporters, many of whom do not carry guns.  Tier 3 are usually local hires in the country of operation or third-country nationals, who are neither citizens of the United States or the country in which they are operating.  None of these tiers contain active duty soldiers.

When PMC contractors make $500 to $1500 per day it is easy to understand why someone would go to work for a PMC, even if it is in an active and hostile warzone.  Military pay is a minute fraction of what these men are making, but that is not the only reason why they join PMCs.  Many soldiers who have reached some of the highest levels of skill and training come home to find that without a college degree they cannot make more than minimum wage doing mainly service jobs.  PMCs offer these men the chance to support their families and use the skills they have learned over a lifetime.  There is rarely any niche for special forces soldiers stateside.

How to become a mercenary: tinyurl.com/dx65sga

Gray Area

The United States Military, as a part of the US government, has mechanisms to prosecute and punish soldiers when they act outside of their command or commit any crimes during combat operations.  PMCs, on the other hand, have been shown to have relatively little, if any, oversight on their actions.  Most of this impunity stems from Paul Bremmer’s Order 17 (full text: tinyurl.com/4a32h) which places PMCs firmly outside the sphere of Iraqi law.  This means that PMCs cannot be prosecuted for breaking any Iraqi law and cannot be brought to court in Iraq.  PMCs were still under US authority, but even the United States government has proven reluctant to prosecute PMCs.

CBS News – Blackwater Cleared in Baghdad Shooting: tinyurl.com/cy38xel

PMCs do have internal accountability structures, formed to promote legitimacy and trust in the deployment and use of PMCs in place of regular troops.  The International Peace Operations Association is the umbrella under which PMCs have come together to find accountability solutions, and along with leading lawyers and human rights specialists have come up with the IPOA Code of Conduct (full text: tinyurl.com/bkaw567 ).  The Code, however, remains largely toothless as it does not possess any real methods for accountability or enforcement.  PMCs possess no internal structures for justice and prosecution and without any willingness by the government to prosecute there remains little real accountability for the contractors working in Iraq.

When Things Go Wrong

Former Vice President Dick Cheney is a big proponent of Private Military Contractors.  He believes that private entrepreneurship will step in and expedite processes that would otherwise be bogged down by military bureaucracy.   Big money and poor oversight, however, create new and sometimes dangerous challenges. 

Security contractors have won contracts without having any personnel on hand, believing that once they have received the contract money they will be able to adequately fulfill the needs of the contract.  In many cases this has led to a shortage of capable personnel, especially local hires, who have been known to take the offer of employment and then not show up to do the work.  With profit, and not country, as the bottom line, sometimes the correct equipment, including armored vehicles, weapons, radios, and other essential and potentially life-saving equipment is unavailable to those who need it most. 

The most devastating instance in which the PMCs failed to provide adequate support to their personnel occurred in Fallujah, Iraq on March 31, 2004.  A convoy of Blackwater employees, traveling in unarmored cars and without an adequate route through the most dangerous city in Iraq, was ambushed and four Blackwater employees killed.  It was 3 years before it was fully understood just what had gone wrong in Fallujah, and just how badly prepared the Blackwater men had been by their own company.

ABC News: Blackwater Bridge Video: tinyurl.com/bzj2k8d

US House Oversight Committee Report on Fallujah 2004: tinyurl.com/al2vjdr

Future of Mercenaries

Mercenaries as PMCs are here to stay.  They free up valuable soldiers and provide top-level security.  The incidents involving unlawful conduct are as numerous in the regular armed forces as they are in the private sector.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the current security climate in many other countries has created a need for security while depleting the number of American armed personnel to do that work.  Contractors work well as security because they have experience in the field, they have already been trained to a high level and are able and capable of deployment.  The benefits seem to outweigh the risks, but the risks are still great.  In the future, as now, private soldiers will be working alongside the military to provide security.

Further reading:

Online
IPOA Code of Conduct review (Amnesty International): tinyurl.com/afd4b24
Council on Foreign Relations Op-Ed – Accept the Blackwater Mercenaries: tinyurl.com/bgoxyat
Op-Ed – Iraq’s mercenaries with a license to kill: tinyurl.com/beq7zkr
Council on Foreign Relations Online Debate with Representatives of IPOA and Amnesty International: tinyurl.com/axmffuv

Books:
Licensed to Kill by Robert Young Pelton: Overview of mercenary activities from the beginning to 2006 and day-to-day experiences of mercenaries in Iraq

Blackwater:The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army by Jeremy Scahill: In-depth look at the activities of Blackwater contractors.


Policies Regarding Mercenaries and Militias


Mercenaries 

Studying policies regarding mercenaries and militias is first and foremost a difficult task because there are little consistent or truly enforced policies pertaining to them.  Both groups operate in a sort of grey area and their situations and actions are often judged on a case by case basis.  Though mercenaries and militias have been around for centuries, policies from the late 80s onward seem to be most relevant because this is the time in which these groups took on new prominence.  (Having said this I will now proceed to talk about a policy from 1977, but the majority of policies discussed will be more current.)

The 1977 Additional Protocols, an addition to the policies of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, define a mercenary quite strictly and declared anyone found to be a mercenary would be deprived the status of Prisoner of War.1  This policy was unable to actually restrain mercenary activity for two main reasons.  First, the definition of “mercenary” was so narrow that very few individuals actually qualify.  Second, without the status of POW, under this policy mercenaries are treated as “non-combatants” and are guaranteed other protections.

In 1989, the UN held The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries and loosened the definition of “mercenary” and also harshened the punishments for mercenary activity.2  UN policy on mercenary use was further strengthened under the General Assembly resolution 58/162 in 2003.3  This policy specifically dealt with mercenary use in relation to human rights–the illegality of using mercenaries to overthrow governments or to inhibit national liberation movements.  This resolution was sparked by, and often mentions, the use of mercenary groups in Africa, which the General Assembly deemed threatening to “constitutional order of these countries and the exercise of the right to self-determination of their peoples” (40).

More recently, the large-scale use of mercenaries in Iraq has incited the creation of new and specific policies on the use of Private Military Contractors (PMCs).  The most notorious of these policies is Order 17.  This order
is a document little-read today, yet it essentially granted to every foreigner in the country connected to the occupation enterprise the full freedom of the land, not to be interfered with in any way by Iraqis or any Iraqi political or legal institution. Foreigners -- unless, of course, they were jihadis or Iranians -- were to be "immune from any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their Sending States," even though American and coalition forces were to be allowed the freedom to arrest and detain in prisons and detention camps of their own any Iraqis they designated worthy of that honor.4
This description of Order 17 featured on CBS News may not use the most neutral language, but it shows the new policy accepted by the US, which allows mercenaries, as well as other foreigners in Iraq, immunity for local law.  This article goes on to point out that the order offers further protection for PMCs in Iraq: "Contractors shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their contracts ... Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal processes with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto ..."  This order is one of the most highly contested policies on mercenary use today.  

Discussion over Order 17 is especially heated because of the human rights violations that Blackwater, a company often used by the US to provide PMCs, as well as other companies like it have been accused of committing on Iraqi soil.  There is major concern over the fact that “analysis of Blackwater's own internal reporting since 2005...found 195 shooting incidents in the last two years, including 160 in which Blackwater employees fired the first shot”.5  The issue with this is that contradicting policies have made it nearly impossible to figure out who has jurisdiction over this issue.  Order 17 has ruled Iraqi courts invalid to handle these possible human rights violations, Blackwater has argued that it cannot be tried in civilian court because it is part of the US Total fore, the company has also argued that it cannot be tried in military court because its employees are not official soldiers, finally the ICC will never see the case because the US has not ratified it.  (Other companies serving similar functions have followed Blackwater’s lead on evading legal repercussions.)  There has been some slight movement towards easing the protections of Order 17, but they have not been sweeping changes.  Even before Order 17 there were issues with how to prosecute PMCs for human rights violations.  In the 90s Dyncorp contractors hired by the UN were implicated in a sex-trafficking operation, but there was debate as to whether they had diplomatic immunity as UN employees.

The actual policy about jurisdiction over PMCs from or working for the US breaks down as follows: “Contractors working directly for the Pentagon fall under a separate law, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, whereas those serving with American troops may be prosecuted under another law, known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But a strong American distaste for trying civilians under military law has led to only one indictment.”6  One major issue with these policies is that PMCs working for private companies as security guards, which is quite common, is not addressed.

Another issue with the regulation of the use of mercenaries is that the line between a security contractor actually working as a guard and a PMC working as a mercenary is blurred.  This issue is nicely articulated by José L. Gómez del Prado, the Chairperson of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries:
In accordance with international humanitarian law if they do not participate in the hostilities they are considered civilians and would have the right to be protected. However, the moment they participate in the hostilities they are not anymore considered civilians and therefore lose international protection. However, how can these “private security guards” be considered civilians when they are heavily armed and ready to take part in direct hostilities? The fact that their statute is unclear; that they are neither civilians nor combatants; that they are operating in a grey area; and that they may be easily assimilated to mercenaries, paramilitaries, irregular fighters or “unlawful combatants”, is undermining the international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions (11-12).7
Without the ability to clearly define which contractors are mercenaries, the policies on how to govern their use is nearly impossible to apply.

Finally, there is the issue with the use of mercenaries on US soil.  The use of Blackwater PMCs during the relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina brought this debate to light.  The contractors were being used both by the government and by private companies for security, the same uses they had in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Blackwater attained a $73 million dollar FEMA contact to help with the relief effort.8  It is of major concern that PMCs are used domestically and there is not clear policy on how they will be held accountable for their actions.

Militias

As with mercenaries, there are not clear policies regarding the use of militias.  There are plenty of policies which have tried to control mercenary use, but they are contradictory or ineffective.  With militias, on the other hand, there is a more blanketed lack of policy.

Militia use was mentioned in the policies that came out of Geneva in 1949, but only briefly.  The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War includes militia members as possible POWs in “countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it.”9  This is a very specific policy, but it sets a large precedent: under certain conditions, militias can be treated like formal armies.  This is one extreme on the spectrum of the status of militias.  When a militia does not constitute all or part of the army they may be called rebel groups, a common term for militias in Africa, or even terrorist organizations.

In Iraq, US policy towards militias has varied greatly.  Though the US has called for the ethnic and sectarian militias in Iraq to dissolve, they not only persist, but some “are on a path to being recognized as part of Iraq’s security apparatus.”10  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the persistence of militia presence in Iraq is alarming because it could lead to the country being governed by fragmented groups rather than a US-trained army.  Some of these militias are sanctioned by the Iraqi government, while others are not–further demonstration of the inconsistent policies about militia use.  The US opposes unsanctioned militias, but again this is not a clear or decisive policy about the existence of militia groups.  Outside of Iraq, the US has deemed many militia groups around the world foreign terrorist organizations.  These organizations are essentially armed groups, armed in various ways, whose “terrorist activity or terrorism...threaten[s] the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.”11  The definition of what qualifies as a foreign terrorist organization is very loose and could easily overlap with groups deemed militias.  In these situations, militia groups would be subject to policies relating to foreign terrorism.

Finally, there are US policies specific to domestic militias.  The FBI defines these groups as follows: 
Like many domestic terrorism groups, militia extremists are anti-government. What sets them apart is that they’re often organized into paramilitary groups that follow a military-style rank hierarchy. They tend to stockpile illegal weapons and ammunition, trying illegally to get their hands on fully automatic firearms or attempting to convert weapons to fully automatic. They also try to buy or manufacture improvised explosive devices and typically engage in wilderness, survival, or other paramilitary training.12
The government does not view “militia extremists” as legitimate and works to shut down such organizations.

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All in all, the policy regarding both mercenaries and militias is confused or lacking.  It is very difficult for such groups to be controlled or tried in courts because there is no consensus on what rules they must abide by and who has jurisdiction over them.




7 “Private Military and Security Companies and Challenges to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries” (download at www.havenscenter.org/files/JLGomez%20del%20Prado-Conf%20Paper_0.doc)













Saturday, February 9, 2013

Defining Mercenaries and Militias


Defining Mercenaries and Militias

Defining Mercenary
Question 1: How do we define what a Mercenary is?
Dictionary.com defines a Mercenary as hired to serve a foreign army guerilla group etc.
Question 2 How do we define what a Mercenary is in a modern Global Context?
The Geneva Convention 1977 additional protocol to the 1949 convention, defines a mercenary in Article 47 section 2 as  (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a
member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. The UN 72 plenary General Assembly of 1989 expands the definition of mercenary to included. (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a      State. 
Despite these very broad definitions Mercenary work which is a profession as old as warfare itself has evolved and adapted to fit the times we live in. It should be noted that international convention only defines a mercenary as some one who is proactively engaged in combat. It says nothing of the 1001 other services that need to be provided in a combat zone. Including communications, logistics, navigation, Intelligence gathering/ analysis, and specialization (e.g. pilots, mechanics etc). To that end; enter the Private Military Firm or security contractor (Here after PMF or SC). Who define themselves as “legally established international firms offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and by military or paramilitary means, as well as the enhancement, the transfer, the facilitation, the deterrence, or the defusing of this potential, or the knowledge required to implement it, to clients.” To that end and despite fitting at times the textbook definition of mercenaries PMF’s and SC are extremely widespread and widely utilized. Often in conjunction with state military forces or state approved PMF trained militia’s.  Despite this broad range of services provided by PMF’s and SC’s. For definition purposes we will lump mercenaries into three broad categories based on the service they provide. 
Category One 
Is the traditional mercenary an individual or group of individuals recruited by a foreign state to serve in a direct combat role. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/former-qaddafi-mercenaries-describe-fighting-in-libyan-war/244356/
Category Two is the security contractor, an individual, company, or group, which provides a limited scope of military and security services under contract to a state corporation or individual. These services can range from logistics, to intelligence to security training, and security personal.
http://www.aegisworld.us/security-operations 
Category Three is the Private Military Company/Private Military Firm a company or group of individuals capable of providing a full package service; logistics, Intel, security, training, and direct combat role. It should be noted that PMC’s do not have to be a thousand strong force of foreigners rather a small group of highly trained individuals capable of training a good size local force then effectively utilizing advanced force multipliers to enhance state forces effectiveness. 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/books/PeaceProfitPlunder/Chap5.pdf
 
Other Useful sources for information regarding mercenaries.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473255
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining Militia
Question: How do we define Militia in a modern global context?
Militia is a very broad term, it can describe anything between a dozen individuals armed with hunting rifles, to a force of millions equipped as well as a professional army. During my research I was unable to find a break down of the groups of militias based on their organization and numbers. There is a wide range off research defining militias motivations, but for the purposes of this post those are largely
 irrelevant. 
Question: Then how do we break down Militias typology?
Based on my own research I have classified militias into four categories based on organization, training equipment, and ability to engage in prolong conventional conflict. At the start of the spectrum is the Community Militia (CM) , this is an informal militia organized by citizens for a variety of reasons ranging from self-defense to vigilante law enforcement. These militias are often small maxing out at maybe 100 members, ill equipped and ill trained if at all. These militias are essentially weekend warriors their purpose is narrow and their commitment to soldering only part time http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2db72,5050583a2,0,,,.html\. Next up the ladder is the Private Militia (PrM), while also a small force these militias are often well equipped and trained. Theses militias are often the private security forces of criminal organizations or wealthy individuals http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/cartel-weapons/ . Next is the Political Militia (PoM) a large force rallied around a specific cause. While these forces can be less well equipped than private forces they are often larger in number and much better equipped than community militias http://www.insightcrime.org/groups-colombia/farc/
. Finally there is the State Sponsored Militia (SM) often the most well equipped and trained as it can draw on the resources of the state and often acts as a adjunct to the states professional armed forces or security services http://www.nationalguard.com/. It should be noted that no militia will fit these categories perfectly; most militias are hybrid models which combined a number of traits from each category.  For example Hezbollah can be characterized as a private militia, a political militia and a state militia all at once. It is controlled by a single powerful group of individuals with a broader political goal and as Hezbollah is now part of the State of Lebanon it has access to state resources; though it should be noted Hezbollah is far better equipped than the state forces. FARC can also be classified as a CM a PoM and a PrM all at once as its largely based out of a limited geographic area exposes a set ideology, but often subcontracts to Narco traffickers and allegedly Colombian left wing politicos.

Other Useful sources regarding Militia’s