The modern international system,
based at least nominally on the liberal principles of cooperation and universal
respect for sovereignty, increasingly rejects the notion of direct military conflict
between states. Additionally, with the destructive innovations in military
technologies over the past decade, the costs of escalating a military conflict
have become prohibitively high to most states. However, despite these
contemporary changes, many international relations scholars argue that the assumptions
of realism, in which states will seek to maximize their power within the
international system, continue to hold today. In the place of direct military
confrontation, states have increasingly acted through proxies over the past
century to achieve military or quasi-military goals.
Loveman argues that, in order to
understand proxy wars, one must understand realism in the context of
contemporary paradigm shifts in the international system and the prohibitively
high costs of direct military engagement (Loveman 2002,
33-36). At first glance, the proxy war phenomenon may
appear irreconcilable with realism, which traditionally has taken a distinctly
state-centric approach toward the international system. States ceding power and
freedom of action to non-state actors may therefore seem counter-intuitive to
traditional realist scholars. However,
While accepting many of realism’s key assumptions, Loveman
argues that realism “neglects three central trends in the modern world: … the
erosion of the nation-state’s power and the concurrent increase in
interdependence … the transition from international system to international
society … [and] the growing unacceptability of war due to its risks and
immorality” (Loveman 2002,
36). The first point regarding the declining
power of the nation-state is perhaps the most difficult to reconcile with
traditional realist theories. Within traditional realist theories, states are
always the principal and most powerful actors. However, modern communication
and military technologies have undoubtedly shifted the balance of power closer
toward non-state actors over the past century. As states have found that they
cannot reliably extinguish non-state actors, they have increasingly co-opted non-state
actors as instruments of state interests. While the use of proxies has notable
downsides, such as a loss of foreign policy autonomy, their use is often the
most effective means of engaging in conflict without risking rapid conflict
escalation (Salehyan 2010,
495).
By “the transition from international system to international
society”, Loveman refers to the shift over the past century away from
state-centrism toward the involvement of private interests, the public through
democratic processes and civil society. Loveman argues that “law, norms and
morality play a greater part in statecraft, and international institutions
become increasingly significant” with the development and growing involvement
of international society (Loveman 2002,
36). Members of international society – from the
general citizenry to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multi-national
corporations (MNCs) – have little interest in engaging in armed conflict as a
method of dispute resolution and virtually zero capability to do so. Therefore,
the granting of more seats at the table of major global decision-making has
decreased the militarization of global dispute mechanisms. With the days of
states conquering sovereign territories behind us, the ambitions of the major
players on the world stage have become primarily economic or defensive. However,
states will continue to promote their security by increasing their power within
the international system, despite the declining interest in military conflict
among international society. In particular, strong states that maintain a
strong appearance of adherence to international norms and a high concentration
of international society institutions utilize proxies in the form of
clandestine operations in order to project military power beyond their own
borders.
With the increasing power and relevance of international society
has come a greater role for liberal international organizations in determining
and dictating events within world affairs. Organizations such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) hold
tremendous economic benefits for beneficiaries of their aid programs or, in the
case of the WTO, their exclusive institutional benefits. Oftentimes, a state’s
adherence to the liberal principles of respect for sovereignty, human rights
and international cooperation significantly influences that state’s access to
international aid programs. In addition, seats at the table of the world’s most
influential decision-making bodies are restricted from states seen to be “breaking
the rules” of the contemporary liberal international system. For example,
Russian accession to the WTO required extensive persuasion that Russia had
peacefully resolved the tensions between Russia and Georgia that led to their
2008 war (Associated
Press 2011). Meanwhile, numerous states accused of
exploiting proxies (i.e. Pakistan, Zambia, United States) enjoy WTO membership.
Therefore, in order to gain the respect of the international system and derive
access to foreign aid, states largely avoid direct state-to-state military
confrontations. The use of proxies however, has not yet elicited a similarly
restrictive posture from the international community.. The growing norm of
international cooperation and respect of state sovereignty relates closely to
Loveman’s third point regarding the growing immorality of war.
Of his three points, Loveman’s third point regarding the tension
between traditional realism and the paradigm shifts of the modern world most
neatly synthesizes with traditional realist conceptions of state-centric action
within an anarchic international system. Under this third point, the “risks” of
war constrain state action, rather than some higher principle or cosmopolitan
ideal of international cooperation. States abstain from military action, not
because they are told to do so, but because in an era of mutually assured
destruction, states can no longer maximize their security outcomes by engaging
in state-to-state military conflicts. Within the mutually assured destruction
paradigm of the Cold War, we can observe this argument first-hand. The US and
USSR’s inability to extract security benefits by engaging in state-to-state
military engagement – which would have likely led to the extinguishment of both
states – arguably led to the proliferation of proxy conflicts in Korea, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia and Latin America.
In the proceeding instances, the prospect of destruction at the
hands of modern military technologies constrained the ability of global
superpowers to engage in direct state-to-state military conflict and pushed
them to use and exploit proxies to advance their foreign policy goals vis-à-vis
their nuclear-armed rivals. However, superpowers risking total annihilation are
not the only states that exploit third parties (either state or non-state) as
proxies in the advancement of their own foreign policy goals. In particular, we
see the phenomenon of state-sponsorship of terrorism most prevalently among
relatively weak states seeking to challenge powerful states while maintaining
plausible deniability (Conrad 2011,
530). Due to the clandestine nature of proxy
relationships, and the classified nature of documentation linking states to
such relationships, it is difficult to view or measure such activities empirically.
However, there is a tremendous quantity of circumstantial evidence tying states
to sponsorship of terrorism as well as the first-hand accounts of those
involved.
Although scholars often discuss terrorism in the context of
non-state actors in the international community, there are often close ties
between state rivalries and the prevalence of terrorism. There is no doubt that
terrorist groups benefit tremendously by exploiting state resources, which may
explain why so many of modern history’s most infamous terrorist attacks (i.e. the
September 11 hijackings, the Mumbai hotel attacks, the Lockerbie bombing) and
groups (i.e. al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah) have or have had alleged connections
to state-sponsors. Indeed, Conrad found that states with ongoing interstate
rivalries have incentives to support terrorism as a means of advancing their
power in the international system without experiencing the same risks of
conflict escalation as other forms of military engagement (Conrad 2011,
531). For example, Iran allegedly sponsors
terrorist activity against rival Israel through proxy support for Hezbollah and
other anti-Israel terrorist groups. However, this activity has yet to escalate
to the interstate level of direct military confrontation between Israel and
Iran in the way that one might expect should Iran be directly implicated in an
attack against Israel.
While state-sponsorship of terrorism is likely the most “in-vogue”
method of engaging in proxy wars, the phenomenon significantly predates the
post-Cold War rise in Islamic extremism. Particularly during the Cold War, the
US and USSR engaged in proxy wars by providing material and other forms of aid
to competing sides of conflicts, such as in the Cold War-era Arab-Israeli wars (Bar-Siman-Tov
1984, 263). However, this pre-Cold War scholarship on
proxy wars focused predominantly on the use of proxies by superpowers to avoid
conflict escalation and nuclear confrontation. Today, the use of proxies by
relatively weak states in an effort to strike disproportionately at rivals
without risking conventional war is arguably a more prevalent phenomenon than
the use of proxies as a matter of constraint by powerful states.
To conclude, the cumulative message of this literature view is
that the classical conceptions of realism need not be in conflict with the
contemporary proliferation of proxy wars. Given modern military technology, the
costs of engaging in direct state-to-state conflict is prohibitively high in
most circumstances. In the absence of conventional military intervention options,
proxies can serve as a useful and effective alternative. Therefore, the use of
proxies enhances rather than constrains the foreign policy options of
the state in many circumstances. While it is accurate that states give up a
degree of autonomy in their use of proxies, this is in-keeping with a more
broad trend in the relative decline in state-centric power.
Finally, additional trends in the use of proxies that will not
be discussed in-depth in this particular literature review are nonetheless
worthy of consideration. One example is a state’s exploitation of proxies in
order to influence political outcomes in other countries. Oftentimes, states
sponsor opposition rebel groups to influence civil conflicts rather than engage
in direct military intervention. For example, the US and its allies have
provided support to opposition rebels in Syria rather than engage in
hostilities against the Assad government. Additionally, states may support
proxies to advance identity-based conflicts, such as we see in Arab countries’
support for the conflict in Kashmir (Bhatt 2003,
219-220). As moral and identity-based considerations
often underpin such support, it does not fit as neatly in the realm of realist
international relations theory as does other forms of proxy war. Additionally,
the escalating great-power confrontation in cyberspace, as states develop
cyber-militarization capabilities on the backs of non-state hacking groups,
warrants further study as a matter of proxy conflict.
Works
Cited
Associated Press. 2011. “Speaker Says Russia’s WTO
Entry Hinges on Georgia”. Fox News.
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/10/25/speaker-says-russias-wto-entry-hinges-on-georgia/.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. 1984. “The Strategy of War by Proxy.” Cooperation and
Conflict 19 (4) (January 1): 263–273.
Bhatt, Shakti. 2003. “State Terrorism Vs. Jihad in Kashmir.” Journal of
Contemporary Asia 33 (2) (January): 215–224.
Conrad, J. 2011. “Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism: An Unprobed Link.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 55 (4) (February 21): 529–555.
Loveman, Chris. 2002. “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention.” Conflict,
Security & Development 2 (3): 37–41.
Salehyan, I. 2010. “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations.” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 54 (3) (January 7): 493–515.
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ReplyDeleteThis question could either fall under definition of proxies or this post. Many Realists demonstarte that states have a tendency to pass the buck to other states, or pass the cost of conflict onto states with a greater interest in seeing the issue resolved. Often the passer will provide supplies, training, and other services to the state receiving the buck, much like a principal state would to its proxy. To what extent are proxies and buck passing the same thing? If there is a difference, what is the threshold between passing the buck to another state and a proxy state/actor?
DeleteWithin Loveman's framework, I would argue that the determining factor would be whether or not the relationship meets the six criteria. For example, while the US provided its allies with material support in the interventions against Libya and Mali (some may say, "passing the buck" / "leading from behind"), I would argue that this was not a proxy relationship between the US and its allies, but standard alliance behavior. In that case, I would argue that the alliance more or less operates as a unitary actor. Additionally, there was not necessarily a "basis in a local conflict", as Loveman requires, in those interventions.
DeleteSo, unfortunately, as Professor Craig has said, often times "it depends" is the most satisfactory answer we can give when it comes to defining proxy wars, due to the challenges of classifying activities that, by definition, seek to dodge classification.
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